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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past four decades, Egypt and China have exhibited high growth rates, though at varying speed. Both 
countries have gone through structural adjustment, liberalisation and privatisation programmes in the past 
years. In this paper, we aim to examine the effects of privatisation, and FDI, along other economic 
determinants, on the economic growth of China and Egypt over the period 1970s – 2010s; using cointegration 
and error correction model (ECM). The preliminary results indicate that privatisation and FDI seem to have 
significant effects on economic growth over the short run in China, while they affect economic growth in 
Egypt over the long-run.   
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     Privatisation is a process that can be defined in two ways. The narrow definition focuses on the sale of 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while the wider definition is the reduction of the size of the public sector 
in the economic activities and allowing the growth of the private sector, whether this is done via selling SOEs, 
or allowing private (domestic and foreign) investors to initiate greenfield investments.  
     In the 1990s, many developing countries followed and engaged with privatisation programmes. While the 
motives of engaging in privatisation may have differed from one country to the other, the ultimate objective 
of engaging in privatisation programmes was to re-structure the economy and achieve higher growth rates.  
     This paper focuses on the effects of privatisation and FDI, among other economic determinants, on 
economic growth in two countries; Egypt and China. Both countries are classified as middle-income 
developing countries. They both launched their major privatisation programmes in 1991; though there were 
some individual and minor privatisation initiatives before that.  
     The Egyptian government efforts of privatising its economy (in the broad sense of privatisation), for 
example, started in the mid-1970s when Egypt adopted an ‘open door’ policy. Though the legislation of the 
‘open door’ policy did not attempt to reduce the size of the public sector, investment laws that were passed 
to encourage private investment, such as Law 43 of 1974, allowed public enterprises to enter in joint ventures 
(JVs) with private investors, and the created JVs are considered as part of the private sector. Hence, the size 
of the private sector increased, without reducing the size of the public sector or selling SOEs. However, these 
JVs were still restricted by some public-sector control practices mainly in terms of employment and pricing 
strategies (Naguib, 2011). In mid-1980s, moderate attempts to privatise some of the public-sector assets, on 
governorates’ level, were undertaken, as the Egyptian government allowed Governorates to sell some of their 
productive enterprises, also known as ‘Governorates-owned projects’ (GOPs). Most GOPs were small- to 
medium-size projects, most of which were valued at less than L.E. 50,000, while some were valued at L.E. 
100,000.1 As a developing country, Egypt has suffered from similar structural and economic problems to 
those faced by most developing countries2. By the second half of the 1980s, and owing to the crash in oil 
prices, Egypt suffered from severe economic disequilibria. For example, Inflation rates soared to 22.6% in 
1986, as compared with 2.1% in 19723, and unemployment rates increased from 7.5% in 1972 to above 12% 
in 1982.4  
     Similarly, in China, since 1978, the government adopted a basket of reform policies including trade 
liberalisation and privatisation to reduce government planning and direct control and increase the role of 
market mechanisms to produce efficient economic growth in China. Earlier privatisation initiatives in China 
started from the rural areas transforming collectivism to “household responsibility system” for farming in 
                                                 
(a) We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers and B&ESI participants in the 2016 annual conference for 
their constructive comments and suggestions. Any errors remain ours. 
   
 
late 1970s and early 1980s followed by the rise in town and village enterprises (TVEs) in late 1980s and early 
1990s. In the meantime, reforms to state owned enterprises (SOEs) gradually rolled out as it was believed 
that delaying the privatisation process for inefficient SOEs5 is a second-best arrangement before the setup of 
necessary regulatory and legal framework (Bai et al. 2009). Different SOE reforms had been experimented 
but undesirable consequences had risen, such as the concealing of SOEs achieved profits and accumulation 
of bad loans; all of which have increased the burden on the government budget.6 
     Meanwhile, before the 1990s, private investments (particularly Foreign Direct Investment; FDI as a 
percentage of GDP) were limited due to the nature of closed, centralised economies of both Egypt and China 
during the 1960s-1970s. In Egypt, economic growth was negative in 1986 and 1987, when GDPpc growth 
rates were -0.13% and -0.28%; respectively. In China, economic growth slowed down and reached a low of 
2.63% in 1989. By then, a need for re-structuring the economy, reducing the size of the public sector, and 
applying policies that encourage foreign investment has risen, and many developing countries; including 
Egypt and China, started applying major privatisation programmes. It was noticed, then, that since 1990s 
onwards, private investment and economic growth in both countries started to recover, though still at varying 
rates. 
     Using Dobronogov and Iqbal (2005)’s five-year moving average method to create and analyse the trends 
in economic growth, domestic investment ratio, and FDI ratio in both countries, one can detect that the during 
the privatisation era of 1990s and 2000s, these three economic variables exhibited positive correlations in 
both countries, as demonstrated in figures 1 and 2 above. Taking Egypt, as an example, one can distinguish 
between four phases of economic development, as illustrated in figure 1: 
1- The domination of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 1960-73. 
2- Open Economy, 1974-85. 
3- Economic Crisis, 1986-91. 
4- Economic reform and Structural Adjustment, 1990s and 2000s. 
     Privatisation in Egypt and China was carried out using various methods; including divestiture, direct sale 
to an anchor or group of investors, creating joint-ventures, leasing, concessions, or privatising via shares 
issues and public offerings. In both countries, however, the favourable method of privatisation was via the 
stock markets and sharing issuing. Table A1 in the appendix reflects Egypt’s dependence on the use of stock 
markets (including various forms of public offerings;) to privatise its SOEs, where the highest numbers of 
transactions and values were recorded. It is worth mentioning, however, that the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) records transactions that yields proceeds more than $500,000. It is, therefore, not reflecting 
all the privatisation transactions carried out in each country. Local agencies may have some extra data 
reported. For example, in a report by PCSU (2001), 180 privatisation transactions in Egypt were recorded for 
the period of 1993-2001 (Table A2 in the appendix), compared to the 174 transactions reported by the IFC 
for the 1993-2008 period. In both sources, however, the conclusion that Egypt was more dependent on the 
stock market in its privatisation programme still holds. The same is observed when analysing the IFC 
Privatisation database over the period of 1990 – 2008 for the case of China, and comparing it to other reports 
on privatisation in China. While Table A3 in the appendix indicates that more than 50% of the recorded 
privatisation transactions were carried out via some sort of shares’ offering and via stock markets, Gan (2009) 
reports that between 1995 and 2005 approximately 100,000 firms with 11.4 trillion RMB worth of assets 
were privatised, compromising two-thirds of China’s SOEs and state assets. However, detailed statistics on 
the transactions are not easy to obtain as Gan (2009, p.581) commented that “except on [Share Issue 
Privatization] SIP, there are no official statistics on the number of firms or the value of the assets that have 
been sold”. 
     There are several empirical studies on the effects of privatisation that investigates the effects on a micro-
level (i.e. the effects on firms’ performances) such as Beirne et al. (2013); Estrin et al. (2009); Driffield and 
Du (2007); Dong et al. (2006); and Sun and Tong (2003). Other studies focus on the effects of privatisation 
on employment (e.g. Bhaskar and Khan, 1995; Cook and Kirkpatric, 1998; and Kikeri, 1998). Very few 
investigated the effects of privatisation on economic growth such as Naguib (2012); McKenzie (2008); 
Filipovic (2005) and Plane (1997). This paper presents the preliminary empirical findings of the effects of 
privatisation and FDI, among other economic determinants, on economic growth during 1970- 2014 in Egypt 
and China. The paper uses the IFC privatisation database (1990-2008) as the source for privatisation proceeds 
in US$ millions. The paper develops as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review of economic 
   
 
growth theories and models. Section 3 presents the methodology and theoretical specification of the model. 
Section 4 presents the preliminary empirical results and Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on World Bank (2016), World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on World Bank (2016), World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 1: EGYPT - Economic Growth, Domestic Investment and FDI trends during 
1960-2014 - 5-years Moving Average
EGYPT - Economic Growth 5-years Moving average
EGYPT - Domestic Investment % GDP - 5-years moving average
EGYPT - FDI % GDP - 5-years moving average
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Figure 2: CHINA - Economic Growth, Domestic Investment and FDI trends during 
1960-2014 - 5-years Moving Average
CHINA - Economic Growth 5-years Moving average
CHINA - Domestic Investment % GDP - 5-years moving average
CHINA - FDI % GDP - 5-years moving average
   
 
     
II. ECONOMIC GROWTH THEORIES LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     The literature presents two main growth theories on which growth empirics are based: the neo-classical 
theory and the endogenous growth theory. Pioneered by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), the neo-classical 
growth theory stipulates that long-run economic growth is solely determined by exogenous changes in 
technology, savings and labour. Changes in capital stock will affect short-run economic growth. In this sense, 
the neo-classical approach regards FDI as an addition to the physical capital stock; hence it will affect 
economic growth in the short run only. 
     However, the neo-classical growth theory does point to the possibility of endogenous effects among the 
three variables of technical progress, capital and labour as “the rate of technical progress may not be 
independent of the rate of accumulation, or … accumulation may give rise to external economies … [and] 
the rate of growth of labour may not be independent of the rate of accumulation” [Swan, 1956, pp. 338-9]. 
Hence, one may argue that in an augmented neo-classical model, the accumulation of FDI may give rise to 
external economies in the form of technological spillovers that are by-products of FDI, and hence FDI can 
affect long-run economic growth. In addition, FDI helps in closing the gap between domestic investment and 
domestic savings. In other words, the effect of an increase in FDI is similar to that of an increase in savings, 
as FDI is simply foreign savings transferred to the host economy.   
     The effects of privatisation on economic growth can also be explained within the neo-classical context. 
While the Keynesian model calls for government intervention, the neo-classical model calls for the reduction 
of government intervention; stipulating that equilibrium and economic growth can be achieved via free-
market practices. In this sense, privatisation, which broadly means the shrinkage of the government size or 
intervention in economic activities, will satisfy the neo-classical condition of equilibrium and economic 
growth. 
     The endogenous growth theory, on the other hand, stipulates that long-run economic growth can be 
achieved by endogenous factors within the system. By differentiating between physical and human capital, 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) argued that the accumulation of human capital in the form of knowledge, 
know-how and innovation, will endogenously induce technological progress and hence achieve sustained 
economic growth.  
     In this sense, supposedly (exogenous) factors such as FDI and privatisation will have endogenous effects 
on other factors of production (e.g. human capital and technological level), which will lead to long-run 
endogenous economic growth. FDI is usually accompanied by transfer of technology, know how, and training 
of labour; all of which contribute to the accumulation of human capital and induce technological progress in 
the host country that will lead to long-run economic growth.  
     It is argued that countries with low levels of physical and human capital will follow the neo-classical 
model in the sense that, in the beginning, growth will be affected by physical capital only, and hence FDI 
will be regarded as an accumulation of physical capital and thus affect short-run economic growth. However, 
to sustain this growth, physical capital needs to be accumulated and, by investing in education, the 
augmentation of human capital would follow7. The transition from neo-classical growth to sustained growth 
will eventually depend on the saving behaviour prevailing in the economy. This implies that the effects of 
FDI in countries with low levels of human capital will follow the neo-classical growth model, whereas in 
countries with high levels of human capital will follow the endogenous growth model. 
     Similarly, the effects of privatisation on long-run economic growth can be explained via its effects on the 
level of innovation in the economy. The private sector is believed to be more innovative than the public sector 
because the former is driven by profit-maximisation objectives and therefore is in constant search of new 
economically profitable production techniques (Gylfason et al., 1998). In that sense, privatisation, which in 
effect means the reduction of the size of the public sector and the expansion of the private sector, will be 
accompanied by increase in the level of innovation and hence will induce long-run economic growth. In 
addition, privatisation can affect other productive factors within the system such as domestic and foreign 
investment. By attracting more foreign investment8, privatisation is indirectly inducing the positive spillovers 
of investment (i.e. technology transfer, labour training and innovation) that will have endogenous effects on 
long-run economic growth.  
 
   
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
 
     Empirical literature includes two methodologies of modelling economic growth9. The first is known as 
“growth accounting”, where variables such as FDI and privatisation are considered as additional inputs in an 
augmented neo-classical production function: 
  
Y = Af (K, L, F, Priv)                                                                                                                                                   (1) 
where Y is output, A captures technological progress, K is capital, L is labour, F is FDI, and Priv is 
privatisation. In other words, the growth accounting methodology reflects the supply side of the economy. 
      
     The second methodology employs an intertemporal utility-maximisation framework of private 
consumption, which models the demand side of the economy10. 
     The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of FDI and privatisation on economic growth, as 
measured by growth in output per capita (i.e. GDP per capita). The growth accounting methodology is 
conventionally used by empirical studies that follow the neoclassical growth model (De Mello, 1997, p. 10), 
as well as other studies that adopt the endogenous growth theory framework (e.g. Li and Liu, 2005). 
Therefore, in this study, we follow the same methodology and use an augmented neo-classical production 
function as the basis for our growth models. 
     A standard neo-classical growth model uses a production function of the form: 
 
Yt = A f (Kt, Lt)                                                                                                                                                               (2) 
where Y is output measured by GDP, A is a constant capturing the state of technology, K is capital and L is 
labour.  
 
     The endogenous growth theory framework; using the growth accounting approach, extends the above 
function by adding any additional inputs that may affect output. Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented the neo-
classical growth model by differentiating between physical capital (K) and human capital (HK):  
 
Yt = A f (Kt, Lt, HKt)                                                                                                                                                       (3) 
 
     Similarly, physical capital can be differentiated into physical domestic capital (K) and physical foreign 
capital (Kf or FDI). Hence, the production function becomes: 
 
Yt = A f (Kt, Lt, HKt, FDIt)                                                                                                                                             (4) 
 
     Data on the active employed labour force are not readily available (Ramirez, 2006). Indeed, the world 
bank reports data for total labour force in Egypt and China only since 1990, which does not offer a time series 
long enough for reliable estimation. So, many empirical studies (e.g. Li and Liu, 2005; Vamvakidis, 2002; 
Pattillo et al., 2002) use population as a proxy for labour. Hence, the above production function becomes:  
 
Yt = A f (Kt, Popt, FDIt, HKt)                                                                                                                                         (5) 
 
     Empirical research indicates that economic growth is also determined by other factors such as the level of 
openness (Edwards, 1998; Vamvakidis, 2002) or degree of export orientation (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996 
and 1999), privatisation (Plane, 1997), and external (foreign) debt (Lin and Sosin, 2001; and Pattillo et al., 
2002).  
     The production function therefore becomes: 
 
Yt = AF (Kt, Popt, FDIt, HKt, Xt)                                                                                                                                   (6) 
where: Yt represents real GDP and Xt represents all other variables that may have an effect on output such as 
Openness (Total Trade as a % of GDP), privatisation (Priv) and external debt (Xdebt). 
 
     Economic growth is measured by growth in real GDP per capita. Gross capital formation (known as Gross 
Domestic Investment) is used to capture the effects of K, and it is measured in per capita (kpc). FDI is 
   
 
measured by Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows per capita (FDIpc). The size of the privatisation 
programme is captured by privatisation proceeds per capita (Privpc). Human capital is measured by 
secondary school enrolment ratio (HK). Openness is measured as total trade of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP (Trat). Finally, the effects of a country’s indebtness on its economic growth is captured 
by the ratio of external debt stock to GDP (xdebtrat).  
     The above function is estimated as a log-linear function, which results in:  
 
∆gdppct = α + β ∆kpct + γ ∆fdipct + λ ∆privpct + δ ∆hkt + η ∆tratt + μ ∆xdebtratt + εt                              (7)    
where lower-case letters denote the natural logs of the relevant variables.  
 
     Growth rates are calculated by first difference (i.e. ∆yt = yt – yt-1)11. The parameters α,β,γ, ..etc represent 
the elasticity of growth in GDP per capita with respect to each explanatory variable. The model is estimated 
over period 1970– 2014. Data for privatisation proceeds were collected from the IFC privatisation database 
and calculated in constant 2005 US$. Privatisation in China started in 1990, while in Egypt the programme 
was announced in 1991, but the first sale took place in 1993; therefore, the missing observations were given 
zero values. Data for all other variables were collected from the online WDI (2016) and were calculated in 
constant 2005 US$. Constant values were calculated by dividing current values over the GDP deflator. The 
GDP deflator for each country was calculated by dividing the GDP (in current US$) over real GDP (in 
constant 2005 US$).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Unit Root tests 
 
     Time series for macroeconomic variables such as GDP usually exhibit time trends (i.e. their mean and 
variance depend on time and the covariance is not constant).12 In such cases, the series is non-stationary (e.g. 
I(1)). In other words, any sudden shock will not fade over time. Including a non-stationary variable in the 
model will result in spurious regression.13 Hence, before estimating the model, we need to test for a unit root 
(i.e. test whether a series is non-stationary [I(1)], or stationary [I(0)]). Once non-stationary series are 
identified, they will be de-trended to avoid spurious regression. 
     To test for a unit root, we apply the Dicky-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests to each 
variable. The DF test estimates the following model: 
 
yt = γ + δt + αyt-1 + εt                                                                                                                                                    (8) 
 
while the ADF test estimates the following model: 
yt = γ + δt + αyt-1 + 


k
j
jty
1
j   + et                                                                                                                       (9) 
     The null hypothesis of the DF and ADF tests is that there is a unit root problem and hence yt is non-
stationary (e.g. I(1)), while the alternative hypothesis is that there is no unit root problem and hence yt is 
stationary (i.e. I(0)). One of the limitations of the DF and ADF tests is their weak power especially in small 
samples. Furthermore, rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis will also depend on the number of lags used. 
Using too many lags will lead to over acceptance of the null hypothesis, while using too few lags may lead 
to over rejection. In addition, the inclusion of deterministic trends affects the results of the DF and ADF 
tests14. A sequence of steps is suggested by Perron (1988), as reported in Harris and Sollis (2003), whereby 
a general specification of DF test is applied that includes both intercept (γ) and time trend (t). If the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected under the general specification of the test, “testing continues down to 
more restricted specifications”15 (i.e. specification with intercept and no time trend, then specification with 
no intercept or time trend). Testing stops as soon as the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.16 The DF 
and ADF tests with intercept and time trend (τδ), and with intercept and no time trend (τγ) for the above 
variables using maximum number of 9 lags17 and using the Akaike Information (AI), Schwarz Bayesian (SB), 
the modified AI, and the modified SB criteria.  
   
 
     Tables (1a) and (1b) report the tests results using the SB criteria only, as the two criteria usually gave the 
same results in most cases. However, AI criterion works better with longer lags and hence it requires large 
samples (Harris and Sollis, 2003, pp. 51-52). The two criteria, however, gave similar results in most cases in 
our models.  
     In very few cases, the results of the ADF tests using different criteria resulted in contradicting results. 
Another limitation of the DF and ADF tests is that they are unreliable when there is a structural break in the 
time series. In such cases, a modified unit root test that takes into consideration structural breaks is required. 
Perron (1989) uses the following model to test for a unit root at the existence of structural break: 
   
k
t
tttttttt eycyyyDTty
1
11
* ~~~~~~     ;~~
~~                                                                          (10) 
where the post-break dummy variable 
*
tDT = t-TB, TB refers to the time of the break,  
*
tDT  = 1 if t>TB and 
0 otherwise.  
     E-views 9 offers this modified version of the ADF test. This version of the test was applied on few 
variables for which the normal ADF test failed to give a definite conclusion. These variables are highlighted 
with the date of the detected break reported next to the test statistic. 
 
Table 1a: Unit Root tests for Egypt’s model 
Variablea τδ (Intercept and Trend) τγ (Intercept only) I 
SB (lags) P-value SB (lags) P-value 
LGDP 
DLGDP 
LGDPpc 
DLGDPpc 
LK  
DLK 
LFDI 
DLFDI 
HK18 
DHK 
LT 
DLT 
LPRIV 
DLPRIV 
LXdebt 
DLXdebt 
LXdebtRat 
DLXdebtRat 
LPop 
DLPop19 
-3.648773 (5) – break in 1989 
-3.778924** (0) 
-2.381606    (2)  
-4.260807*** (3) 
-3.078151    (1) 
-4.938455*** (0) 
-3.029564    (0) 
-4.376700*** (2) 
-1.62817      (0) 
-6.517784*** (1) 
-2.226689    (1) 
-4.304697*** (0) 
-2.019868    (0) 
-5.880180*** (0) 
-1.611576    (0) 
-4.974627*** (0) 
-1.794076    (0) 
-5.348378*** (0) 
-1.387551    (4) 
-3.850729 (8) – break in 2001 
0.5981 
0.0275 
0.3834 
0.0087 
0.1243 
0.0013 
0.1361 
0.0063 
0.6562 
0.0000 
0.4633 
0.0073 
0.5745 
0.0001 
0.7723 
0.0012 
0.6907 
0.0004 
0.8495 
0.4679 
-2.012592 (0) – break in 2005 
-3.267396**  (1) 
-1.752089    (0)  
-3.289585**  (3) 
-2.778773*   (0) 
-4.582222*** (0) 
-2.898399*   (0) 
-4.051628*** (2) 
-1.917345    (0) 
-6.086487*** (1) 
-0.963594    (1) 
-4.376995*** (0) 
-2.075703    (0) 
-5.909443*** (0) 
-2.809227*   (0) 
-4.177968*** (0) 
-0.137802    (0) 
-4.568762*** (0) 
-2.256644    (0) 
-4.286495* (3) – break in 1986 
0.9817 
0.0229 
0.3988 
0.0221 
0.0695 
0.0006 
0.0536 
0.0030 
0.3215 
0.0000 
0.7577 
0.0011 
0.2551 
0.0000 
0.0652 
0.0020 
0.9386 
0.0006 
0.1906 
0.0770 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
Notes: 
- τδ is the general specification of the test that includes both time trend and intercept. τγ is a restricted 
specification of the test that includes intercept but no time trend. 
- The tests were done in E-views 9.  
- (***) denotes rejecting the H0 at 1%, (**) denotes rejecting the H0 at 5%, while (*) denotes rejecting 
the H0 at 10%. 
- L denotes natural log of the adjacent variable, while DL denotes the first difference. 
a- In equation 7 the variables are in per capita form. The tests were performed on individual time series before 
they were transformed into per capita or GDP forms. A combined variable (e.g. LKpc) of two I(1) series (e.g. 
LK and LPop)  will also be I(1). A combined variable in which any of the series is an I(1) will always be an 
I(1). The ADF test on LXdebtrat (i.e. Log of External debt as a percentage of GDP) indicated that it is I(1) 
in levels, while one of the ADF tests on LXdebt showed that it is I(0) at the 10% significance level. But as 
the ADF tests show that LGDP is I(1) in levels, the combined variable LXdebtrat was found to be I(1) in 
levels.      
   
 
Table 1b: Unit Root tests for China’s model 
Variablea τδ (Intercept and Trend) τγ (Intercept only) I 
SB (lags) P-value SB (lags) P-value 
LGDP 
DLGDP 
LGDPpc 
DLGDPpc 
LK  
DLK 
LFDI 
DLFDI 
LHK 
DLHK 
LT 
DLT 
LPRIV 
DLPRIV 
LXdebtRat 
DLXdebtRat 
LPop 
DLPop 
-4.617942* (9)- break in 198920 
-3.336767*    (1) 
-3.883292 (1)- break in 2004  
-3.337565*   (1) 
-3.754578 (1)- break in 2006 
-5.554244*** (0) 
-1.462456    (0) 
-6.550027*** (0) 
-1.326606    (0) 
-4.520681*** (0) 
-0.927225    (0) 
-5.255342*** (0) 
-2.344877    (0) 
-6.127068*** (0) 
-0.457792    (0) 
-4.303247*** (1) 
-2.102174    (9) 
-4.845339* (3)- break in 1997  
0.0969 
0.0743 
0.4469 
0.0742 
0.5293 
0.0002 
0.8274 
0.0000 
0.8680 
0.0041 
0.9435 
0.0005 
0.4021 
0.0000 
0.9820 
0.0075 
0.5267 
0.0522 
-0.968802 (2)- break in 1991 
-3.352277**  (1) 
-0.867656 (2)- break in 1991  
-3.227948**  (1) 
-0.803676 (1)- break in 1982 
-5.496824*** (0) 
-1.509873    (0) 
-6.499297*** (0) 
-0.701146    (2) 
-4.515535*** (0) 
-1.797589      (0) 
-4.936913*** (0) 
-0.747377    (0) 
-6.201646**** (0) 
-1.657136    (0) 
-4.737083*** (0) 
-2.367845    (2)21 
-5.787500***(8)- break in 1989 
> 0.99 
0.0186 
> 0.99 
0.0252 
> 0.99 
0.0000 
0.5194 
0.0000 
0.8354 
0.0007 
0.3769 
0.0002 
0.8238 
0.0000 
0.4455 
0.0004 
0.1567 
< 0.01 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
Notes: 
- τδ is the general specification of the test that includes both time trend and intercept. τγ is a restricted 
specification of the test that includes intercept but no time trend. 
- The tests were done in E-views 9.  
- (***) denotes rejecting the H0 at 1%, (**) denotes rejecting the H0 at 5%, while (*) denotes rejecting 
the H0 at 10%. 
- L denotes natural log of the adjacent variable, while DL denotes the first difference. 
a- In equation 7 the variables are in per capita form. The tests were performed on individual time series before 
they were transformed into per capita or GDP forms. A combined variable (e.g. LKpc) of two I(1) series (e.g. 
LK and LPop)  will also be I(1). 
 
     The results of the unit root tests reported in tables (1a) and (1b) indicate that all variables in the Egyptian 
and Chinese models are I(1) in levels. When the results of the τγ (i.e. intercept but no trend) test contradict 
those of the τδ (intercept and trend) test such as in the case of LK, LFDI and LXdebt in table (1a), the variable 
is plotted to see whether it follows a trend or not. If the variable appears to follow a trend, then the results of 
τδ will be accepted.22   
 
B. COINTEGRATION AND LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP 
 
     As the results of the unit root tests indicate that all variables are I(1) in levels, to ensure obtaining non-
spurious regression results, it is necessary to determine whether the variables are cointegrated and whether 
there exists a long-run relationship among them. This can be done by applying Johansen’s test for 
cointegration (Maddala, 2001). The cointegration tests are carried out using E-views. The programme can 
perform the test using different models depending on the assumptions regarding the data trend and test type. 
Tables (2a) and (2b) report the results of Johansen’s tests for both the Egyptian and Chinese models; 
respectively.   
     The cointegration tests indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. Hence, estimating the long-run (LR) relationship between the variables using OLS method 
will result in non-spurious results. The LR relationship is estimated using the following equation, and the 
results are presented in table 3: 
 
gdppct = α + β kpct + γ fdipct + λ privpct + δ hkt + η tratt + μ xdebtratt + εt                                              (11) 
  
   
 
Table 2a: Johansen’s cointegration test (EGYPT), 1970 – 2014 
For series LGDPpc, LKpc, LFDIpc, LPrivpc, HK, LTrat, and LXdebtrat 
Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 4 4 3 3 3 
Max-Eig 3 3 3 3 3 
 
Table 2b: Johansen’s cointegration test (CHINA), 1970 – 2014 
For series LGDPpc, LKpc, LFDIpc, LPrivpc, LHK, LTrat, and LXdebtrat 
Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 2 3 2 3 2 
Max-Eig 1 2 2 2 2 
Notes: 
* Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michellis (1999) 
 
Table 3: The OLS estimations of the long-run relationship; dependent variable gdppc 
Variable Egypt China 
Constant 
 
kpc 
 
fdipc 
 
privpc 
 
hk 
 
trat 
 
xdebtrat 
 
5.44367 
(13.68)*** 
0.260697 
(3.958)*** 
0.0443508 
(3.375)*** 
0.00612594 
(2.575)** 
0.0133028 
(6.778)*** 
-0.0746592 
(-0.8784) 
-0.175663 
(-5.771)*** 
1.32792 
(5.388)*** 
0.892722 
(26.76)*** 
-0.0141503 
(-0.6283) 
-0.00318988 
(-1.045) 
0.0526797 
(0.7354) 
-0.00792549 
(-0.1838) 
0.0268374 
(0.9927) 
No. of Observations 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
Autocorrelation LM Testb 
Collinearity Test 
44 
0.967262 
0.961953 
9.2116*** 
No Collinearity Problem 
45 
0.997703 
0.997340 
27.3861*** 
Collinearity problema 
Notes:  
- Estimated using GRETL 
- (*) denotes statistical significance at 10%  
- (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% 
- (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% 
- t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
a- The collinearity test indicates collinearity problem for trat, xdebtrat, fdipc, and kpc. The Chinese model 
has been re-estimated using various lags, however, both the collinearity and autocorrelation problems 
persisted. Hence, the above results, though unbiased, are inefficient, and therefore, should be interpreted with 
caution.  
b- The null hypothesis for the Autocorrelation LM test is “no autocorrelation”. 
 
   
 
     According to the table (3), the evidence suggests that, in Egypt, long-run economic growth responds 
positively to the levels of domestic investment, foreign direct investment, privatisation, and human capital. 
External debt on the other hand will negatively affect the level of GDP. All the estimated significant 
coefficients in the Egyptian model exhibit the expected signs. The results of the Chinese model, on the other 
hand, seem to suggest that long-run economic growth is affected by domestic investment only, as its estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
     One should, however, proceed with caution when interpreting these results. Both models seem to exhibit 
problems of autocorrelation, and the Chinese model, exhibits collinearity problem as well. These two 
problems will render the estimates inefficient, but not biased. Usually the autocorrelation problem can be 
solved when lagged explanatory variables are added. However, different versions of the Chinese model, for 
example, were applied with 1 and 2 lags, still the same problems persisted according to the autocorrelation 
and the collinearity tests. Despite these two problems, an ADF test was carried out for the residuals of the 
above models, and it found that the residuals are stationary, which means that we can proceed to estimate the 
error correction models.  
 
C. ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
 
     The residuals of the long run relationship reported in Table 3 (i.e. error correction term; EC) is an I(0) 
variable and it is used to construct an error correction model. The advantage of such models is that they 
capture the short- and long-run effects of the determinants of economic growth (Hendry, 2000; Maddala, 
2001). The error correction model for equation 7 now becomes: 
 
∆gdppct = α + β ∆kpct-i + γ ∆fdipct-i + λ ∆privpct-i + δ ∆hkt-i + η ∆tratt-i + μ ∆xdebtratt-i + θ gdppct-1 + φ 
ECt-1 + εt                                                                                   
(12)  
where i = the number of lags. ECt-1 is the lagged residual of the cointegrated relationships reported in table 3. 
Parameters α, β, γ, λ, δ, η, μ and θ represent short-run elasticities for growth in GDP per capita with respect 
to changes in the explanatory variables. A lagged dependent variable (LDV) is added to capture the effects 
of past economic growth rates on current economic growth. It is expected that the sign of the estimated 
coefficient of the LDV will be positive.  The coefficient of the error correction term (φ) is an adjustment 
parameter that reflects the speed of correcting the deviation of the current economic growth from its long-
run relationship with the explanatory variables.  
     The ‘general-to-specific’ approach has been used when estimating equation (12), which has been proven 
to be successful in driving a unique representative model.23 The general model of equation (12) is run with a 
maximum of 2 lags for each variable owing to the shortness of the time period covered24. Table 4 presents 
the results of the general and the best specific error correction models that are estimated over the period of 
1970 – 2014 for Egypt and China; respectively. None of the estimated ECM models for Egypt and China 
show any problems of autocorrelation or multicollinearity25. 
     The estimated models reported in columns 3 and 5 of table (4) represent the best models for Egypt and 
China using the ‘general-to-specific’ approach. F-tests do not allow for deleting any further variable from the 
above models. Deleting any further variable would result in misspecification, and hence, the estimated 
coefficients would be biased. The estimated coefficients represent the elasticities of changes in GDP per 
capita growth in response to change in the explanatory variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 4: Error correction Models, dependent variable ∆gdppc, 1970 – 2014 
Variable 
Egypt China 
General Specific General Specific 
Constant 
 
∆kpct 
 
∆kpct-1 
 
∆kpct-2 
 
∆fdipct 
 
∆fdipct-1 
 
∆fdipct-2 
 
∆privpct 
 
∆privpct-1 
 
∆privpct-2 
 
∆hkt 
 
∆hkt-1 
 
∆hkt-2 
 
∆tratt 
 
∆tratt-1 
 
∆tratt-2 
 
∆xdebtratt 
 
∆xdebtratt-1 
 
∆xdebtratt-2 
 
∆gdppct-1 
 
ECt-1 
0.0137 
(2.512)** 
0.0396 
(1.310) 
0.0370 
(1.184) 
na 
 
0.0049 
(1.159) 
-0.0024 
(-0.6533) 
na 
 
-0.0035 
(-0.4155) 
-6.401e-05 
(-0.0688) 
na 
 
0.0014 
(1.394) 
-0.0019 
(-1.767)* 
na 
 
-0.0857 
(-1.903)* 
0.0568 
(1.174) 
na 
 
-0.0105 
(-0.4367) 
0.01890 
(0.8392) 
na 
 
0.4496 
(3.467)*** 
−0.1372 
(−1.963)* 
0.0135 
(2.795)*** 
0.0458 
(1.949)* 
--- 
 
na 
 
0.0041 
(1.079) 
--- 
 
na 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.3393) 
--- 
 
na 
 
0.0017 
(1.785)* 
-0.0019 
(-2.009)* 
na 
 
-0.0915 
(-2.172)** 
0.0828 
(2.110)** 
na 
 
--- 
 
0.0249 
(1.268) 
na 
 
0.4736 
(4.008)*** 
-0.1397 
(-2.402)** 
0.0302 
(2.404)** 
0.3939 
(6.123)*** 
−0.1620 
(−2.030)* 
0.0202 
(0.3116) 
0.0481 
(2.320)** 
−0.0061 
(−0.4525) 
0.0083 
(0.5147) 
0.0006 
(0.4546) 
0.0014 
(0.8836) 
0.0049 
(3.070)*** 
−0.0376 
(−0.6739) 
0.0308 
(0.5180) 
−0.0907 
(−1.957)* 
−0.0035 
(−0.1135) 
−0.0153 
(−0.4911) 
−0.0151 
(−0.4734) 
−0.0078 
(−0.4634) 
0.0166 
(0.9240) 
−0.0288 
(−1.497) 
0.3443 
(2.157)** 
−0.1348 
(−1.503) 
0.0306 
(4.283)*** 
0.4076 
(8.330)*** 
−0.1684 
(−2.790)*** 
--- 
 
0.0377 
(3.203)*** 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
0.0013 
(1.357) 
0.0047 
(4.197)*** 
--- 
 
--- 
 
−0.0923 
(−3.019)*** 
--- 
 
--- 
 
−0.0135 
(−0.6592) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
−0.0223 
(−1.746)* 
0.3569 
(3.037)*** 
−0.17996 
(−3.029)*** 
observations 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
Autocorrelation LM test 
Collinearity test 
42 
0.649975 
0.468481 
2.26644 
No problem 
42 
0.623759 
0.502390 
0.66363 
No problem 
42 
0.842474 
0.692449 
0.256832 
No problem 
42 
0.81867 
0.759511 
0.030442 
No Problem 
Notes: 
Estimated using GRETL. t-ratios are in brackets. (***) indicates significance at 1%, (**) indicates 
significance at 5%, while (*) indicates significance at 10%.  
 
   
 
     Economic growth, in a given year, seems to respond positively to changes in domestic investment. The 
effect of domestic investment on short-run economic growth in China is relatively stronger than that in Egypt. 
A 1% increase in the growth of domestic investment per capita would lead to 0.05% increase in economic 
growth in the same year, ceteris paribus, in Egypt. In China, on the other hand, both current and lagged 
domestic investment per capita significantly affects short-run economic growth. According to the results, a 
1% increase in current domestic investment per capita will lead to a 0.41% increase in short-run economic 
growth, ceteris paribus. The estimated coefficient of the lagged domestic investment, however, is negative 
and statistically significant. A 1% increase in domestic investment per capita in a given year will lead to a 
0.17% decrease in economic growth in the following year. One may argue that the net effect of growth in 
capital stock on economic growth will be positive as the size of the short-run coefficient of ∆kpct is larger 
than that of the lagged variable. Hence, growth in domestic investment will have positive significant effects 
on short-run economic growth in China. In the long-run, domestic investment has positive effects on 
economic growth in both Egypt and China (Table 3). A 1% increase in the level of domestic investment per 
capita will lead to a 0.26% and 0.89% increase in the level of GDPpc in Egypt and China; respectively. The 
positive effects of domestic investment on economic growth is consistent with the evidence reported in 
previous empirical studies (e.g. Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003; Zhang, 2001; Vamvakidis, 2002).  
     The ECM model also indicates that growth in FDI net inflows per capita has positive significant effects 
on short-run economic growth in China, though not in Egypt. A 1% increase in the growth of FDI per capita 
will result in a 0.04% increase in economic growth in the same year. Our results are consistent with evidence 
from other empirical studies in terms of the sign of the estimated coefficient. However, our results report a 
smaller effect of FDI on short-run economic growth than other empirical studies. Zhang (2001) found that 
the effect of the growth in FDI stock on current economic growth in China was around 0.2 for the period 
1989-93. 
     While FDI seems to have no significant effect on the Egyptian economic growth in the short-run, table 3 
indicates that it has a significant positive effect on economic growth in the long run. A 1% increase in the 
level of FDI per capita will lead to a 0.04% increase in the level of GDPpc. This is consistent with the neo-
classical growth theory stipulation that an increase in physical capital- whether domestic or foreign- will lead 
to short-run economic growth. FDI can have negative effects on economic growth if the remittances of FDI 
profits exceed the value of new FDI inflows and hence create negative effects on the balance of payments 
and/or if FDI is crowding out domestic investment (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003). On the other hand, if 
FDI is complementing domestic investment, then FDI will have positive effects on economic growth 
(Ramirez, 2006). Moreover, the effects of FDI on economic growth will depend on the sector in which it 
takes place. FDI in the primary sector tends to have negative effects on economic growth, while FDI in the 
manufacturing sector tends to have positive effects (Alfaro, 2003). 
     The effects of privatisation on economic growth differ between Egypt and China. While the results 
indicate that privatisation will have positive effects on long-run economic growth in Egypt (Table 3), the 
estimated effect on short-run economic growth is insignificant (Table 4). In the long run, a 1% increase in 
privatisation proceeds per capita will result in a 0.006% increase in the level of GDPpc in Egypt. In China, 
on the other hand, privatisation seems to have no significant effects on long-run economic growth (Table 3). 
However, in the short run, a 1% increase in the growth of privatisation proceeds per capita will lead to a 
0.005% increase in economic growth in two years’ time. A study carried out on provincial levels in China 
(Zhao, 2013) covering 31 provinces during 1978-2008 found out significant positive effects of privatisation 
on economic growth. Plane (1997) also found that privatisation had significant positive effects on economic 
growth in a panel of developing countries. 
     The limited effects of privatisation on economic growth in China, on the other hand, can be explained by 
the lack of complete data about all privatisation transactions as highlighted by Gan (2008). The limited effects 
of privatisation on economic growth in both Egypt and China could also relate to the methods of privatisation 
mostly used in Egypt and China. As indicated earlier, both countries rely more on stock markets when 
privatising their SOEs (Tables A1 – A3). Bennett et al. (2007) carried out a study investigating the effects of 
different privatisation methods on economic growth in 23 transition economies during 1990-2003 and found 
out that the most influential method in speeding up economic growth in these countries is voucher 
privatisation; a method that is popularly used in Eastern European countries, but not in countries such as 
Egypt and China. Similarly, Gouret (2007) found out that positive effects on the level of output (rather than 
on the growth) will depend on the method of privatisation used in transition economies. Other factors that 
   
 
may explain the limited effects of privatisation (and foreign investment as well) is the lack of well-developed 
capital markets (Lucas, 1990; Borensztein et al., 1998; and Plane 1997); a case that applies more on the 
Egyptian case than on the Chinese case. The effects of privatisation on economic growth in developing 
countries will also depend on the availability of certain competition and regulatory policies. Cook and Uchida 
(2003) carried out a study on 63 developing countries; covering the period of 1988-1997. They found no 
positive effects of privatisation on economic growth and that effective competition and regulations are needed 
to accompany privatisation in order to obtain positive impacts on economic growth. Similarly, Filipovic 
(2005); using a cross-country regression model on developing countries during 1990-1999, found that the 
effect of privatisation depends on other policy variables that are included in the model. 
     The results of the error correction models also indicate that growth in human capital may have very small 
significant effects on short-run economic growth in Egypt. A 1% point increase in the growth rate of human 
capital will lead to 0.002% point increase in economic growth in the same year, and a decrease by 0.002% 
point in economic growth in the following year, ceteris paribus. The estimated coefficients are significant at 
10% significance level. One may argue, hence, that growth in human capital may not have an effect on short-
run economic growth in Egypt.26 In the long run, however, human capital has a significant, and relatively 
larger, effect on Egypt’s GDP per capita. A 1% point increase in human capital growth will lead to a 0.01% 
point increase in GDP per capita (Table 3). In China, on the other hand, human capital seems to have no 
significant effects on China’s GDPpc in the long run (Table 3), while it seems to have a negative and 
significant lagged effect on economic growth in the short-run. According to the results reported in table 4, a 
1% increase in human capital growth will lead to a decrease of 0.09% in economic growth in two years’ time. 
The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
     Empirical studies have reported similar conflicting effects of human capital on economic growth in 
developing countries. While some empirical studies (e.g. Edwards, 1998; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Li and Liu 
2005) reported significant positive effects of human capital on economic growth, others (e.g. Nunnenkamp 
and Spatz, 2003; Zhang, 2001; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Islam, 1995) found insignificant positive, and 
sometimes negative, effects of human capital on economic growth. Such inconsistency in reported results 
can be attributed to the quality of proxies used. Islam (1995) argues that, statistically speaking, the sign 
of hk depends on the quality of, and the method of constructing, data used. The indicator used to proxy human 
capital (simply because it offered the most available data for our sample) is the secondary school enrolment 
ratio. Enrolment in secondary school may not be the best proxy to capture the “quality” of schooling, and 
hence, the quality or skill level of the human capital in a given country. Hence, this can explain the some of 
the unexpected results for this indicator. 
     Economic growth is also affected by the degree of openness of the economy (Edwards, 1990). Openness 
can be measured using various proxies as indicated earlier. In this study, we use the ratio of total trade 
(including exports and imports in goods and services) to GDP as a measure of openness. According to the 
results reported in both Tables 3 and 4, Trade ratio seems to have no significant effects on long-run economic 
growth in neither Egypt nor China. In the short-run, on the other hand, while trade ratio still has no significant 
effects on economic growth in China, it seems to be having significant effects economic growth in Egypt. 
According to the results, a 1% increase in the growth of the trade ratio will lead to a 0.09% decrease in current 
economic growth, but a 0.08% increase in the following year’s economic growth. While total trade reflects 
the overall openness of an economy, in countries that exhibit very large trade deficits, the effects may be 
negative on its growth rate. Perhaps a more suitable proxy would be exports ratio to GDP, to measure a 
country’s adoption of export-promotion policies, which can be a positive factor to attract new export-led 
investment (whether domestic or foreign) and achieve higher economic growth rates (Ramirez, 2006; Nair-
Reichert and Weinhold, 2001)  
     Another determinant of economic growth is the ratio of external debt stock to GDP. The estimated results 
reported in tables 3 and 4 indicate that external debt seems to have no significant effect on long-run economic 
growth in China. However, in Egypt, a 1% increase in the external debt stock ratio will lead to a 0.18% 
decrase in GDPpc in the long-run. External debt can have either positive or negative effects on economic 
growth. If external debt is at reasonable levels and if it is used in financing new investments, then it is 
expected to have positive effects on economic growth (Pattillo et al., 2002). On the other hand, external debt 
may also have negative effects on economic growth if it is accumulated by a higher rate than the rate of 
investment (Lin and Sosin, 2001; Pattillo et al., 2002). Egypt had high external debt ratios (i.e. 115% in 
1989)27. Moreover, in Egypt, the average external debt ratio (for the period of 1970-2014) is 54.87%, which 
   
 
is higher than the average domestic investment ratio 22.13%.28 Such high levels of foreign debt generated a 
foreign-debt crisis in Egypt, which required some intervention in the form of economic reform policies to 
reduce the debt levels. Hence, the estimated negative effect is what might be expected in the case of Egypt. 
In the short run, the situation is reversed. The growth in the external debt stock ratio seems to have no 
significant effects on the Egyptian economic growth in the short-run. However, in China, a 1% increase in 
the growth of external debt stock ratio will lead to a 0.02% decrease in economic growth in two years’ time. 
However, the estimated coefficient is smaller in size and is significant at only 10% significance level. 
     Past economic growth ratios have positive and highly significant effects on short-run economic growth in 
both Egypt and China. A 1% increase in economic growth rate in one year will lead to a 0.47% and 0.36% 
increase in economic growth in the following year in Egypt and China; respectively. 
     The coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECt-1) is negative and statistically significant. This 
negative coefficient indicates the speed of adjustment required to return to the long-run relationship. The 
values of the estimated coefficients, however, indicate that the adjustment speed is relatively slower in the 
cases of Egypt and China than in other developing countries. The deviation between current growth and the 
long-run relationship will be corrected by 14% and 18% in the following year in Egypt and China; 
respectively. Other empirical studies have estimated a faster adjustment speed. In Argentina, for example, an 
ECM model covering period 1971-2000 shows that the deviation between the short- and long-run 
relationships will be corrected by 34.8% in the following year (Naguib, 2012).  
     Overall, the results of the estimated error correction model in Table 4 quantify the determinants of 
economic growth in Egypt and China during 1970-2014. The R2 in both models indicates that the estimated 
error correction model explains 62.4% and 81.9% of the changes in economic growth in Egypt and China; 
respectively. Diagnostic tests indicate no problems of autocorrelation or multicollinearity.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
     In order to measure the effects of FDI and privatisation on economic growth in Egypt and China during 
1970-2014, time-series error correction models were constructed using the general-to-specific approach. The 
advantage of error correction models is that they combine both the short-run and long-run effects on economic 
growth.  
     Both FDI and Privatisation were found to have positive and significant; though relatively small, effects 
on long-run (but not short-run) economic growth in Egypt. In China, on the other hand, while there was no 
statistical significant evidence that either FDI or Privatisation have an effect on long-run economic growth, 
the evidence suggests that they do positively affect economic growth in the short run. Growth in FDI per 
capita will have positive effects on current economic growth, while the growth in privatisation proceeds per 
capita will have a 2-years lag effect on economic growth. The limitation in the size of privatisation effects, 
however, may be attributed to the lack of complete data on all privatisation transactions that have values less 
than $500,000 (as these were not recorded by the IFC), or the fact that data on many direct sale transactions 
(particularly in China) are difficult to obtain.  
     The sign of the FDI coefficient also indicates whether FDI complements or substitutes domestic capital 
(De Mello, 1999; and Borensztein et al., 1998). Positive coefficients of FDI indicate that FDI complements 
domestic capital. In that sense, the evidence suggests that FDI and domestic investment are complements in 
the short-run in China, and in the long-run in Egypt.  
     The evidence also suggests that the positive impact of FDI on long-run economic growth during 1970-
2014 is rather small in Egypt, as the value of the estimated coefficients are not larger than 0.10. This may be 
related to the type of trade policy applied. Empirical research (e.g. Balasubramanyam et al., 1996 and 1999; 
Ramirez, 2006) shows that the effects of FDI are larger in countries that apply export-promotion rather than 
import-substitution policies. For most of the time period covered, import-substitution policies were applied 
until the late 1980s in Egypt. Thus, in Egypt, the majority of FDI projects (except those in the primary sector) 
are resource- and market-seeking projects (UNCTAD, 1999a).  
     The models investigate the effects of other determinants on economic growth in both countries, such as 
human capital, openness, external debt, domestic investment and past rates of economic growth. The one 
determinant that has been consistently statistically significant in all models for both countries is domestic 
investment. Both short- and long-run models have shown a positive significant effect of domestic investment 
on economic growth in both countries. As shown in figures 1 and 2, during the privatisation era of 1990 – 
   
 
2008, domestic investment ratio has been increasing in both countries. This proves that privatisation, in its 
broader definition of the reduction of the public-sector activities and encouraging more private sector 
activities, had positive spillovers on the size of domestic investments in these two countries, which led to 
increase in their economic growth. 
     The explanatory power of the ECM models may be further improved by using different proxies for our 
variables. For example, finding other measures for privatisation than sale proceeds to account for the wider 
meaning of privatisation may capture the effect of privatisation on economic growth more accurately. 
Similarly, the use of export ratio to GDP may reflect a more accurate measure for the openness of an 
economy. Furthermore, a different method in accounting for missing values, other than assuming them to 
equal to zero, may improve the results. Our further research will aim to address these shortcomings as well 
as extending the model to include non-economic determinants of economic growth (e.g. political instability, 
corruption, etc.); especially for the case of Egypt to capture the effects of the Arab Spring that may have 
negatively affected its economic growth in the subsequent years. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
All Data are collected from the World Development Indicators, World Bank (2016); except for the data of 
privatisation, which is collected from the IFC. All monetary variables are in constant 2005 US$.  
- ∆gdppct = growth in GDP per capita 
- ∆kpct = growth in domestic investment per capita. The sign of its coefficient is expected to be positive 
as an increase in domestic investment or domestic capital leads to an increase in economic growth. The 
indicator used is Gross Capital Formation (formerly known as Gross Domestic Investment. 
- ∆fdipct = growth rate in FDI net inflows per capita. FDI may have positive or negative effects on 
economic growth depending on the nature of its spillovers. If FDI complement domestic investment, 
participate in augmenting human capital, and facilitates the transfer of appropriate technology, then it is 
expected to have positive effects. However, if FDI leads to substantial transfers of profits from the host 
country, transfer of inappropriate capital, or crowding out domestic investment, then it can have negative 
effects on economic growth (Ramirez, 2006). In addition, the effects of FDI on economic growth depend 
on the sector in which it takes place. FDI in manufacturing tend to have positive effects on growth while 
FDI in the primary sector tends to have negative effects.29 Hence, the sign of the coefficient may be 
either positive or negative.  
- ∆hkt = growth rate in human capital. The proxy used to measure human capital is the Gross Secondary 
school enrolment ratio. The coefficient is expected to be positive.  
- ∆tratt = growth in total trade as a ratio of GDP. It measures the openness of an economy. The more open 
an economy, the faster is its economic growth. Hence, the expected sign of the coefficient is positive.  
- ∆privpct = growth in privatisation proceeds per capita as a measure of the size of the privatisation 
program applied in the country. Large privatisation programmes reflect the shrinkage of the size of the 
public sector, and therefore, its coefficient is expected to be positive. 
- ∆xdebtratt = growth in external foreign debt stock as a percentage of GDP. In neoclassical models, 
external debt is expected to have positive effect on economic growth if it is in reasonable levels and if it 
is used to finance investment (Pattillo et al., 2002). On the other hand, external debt may also have 
negative effects on economic growth if it is accumulated by a higher rate than the rate of investment (Lin 
and Sosin, 2001; Pattillo et al., 2002). Hence, the sign of the external debt coefficient can be either 
positive or negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table A1: EGYPT - Privatisation transactions by technique between 1993 and 2008 
Privatisation Method Proceeds (US$ millions) No. of transactions 
Stake Purchase (more than 50%) 361.90 2 
Anchor Investor 190.38 2 
Asset Sale/ Liquidation 174.61 5 
Concession (Build, rehabiltate, 
Operate and Transfer) 
125.00 1 
Direct Sale 237.26 4 
Divestiture (either full or partial) 2433.03 17 
Employee Share Association 93.25 12 
GDR (secondary issue) 120.00 1 
Greenfield 2900.00 1 
IPO 104.70 1 
IPO & Private Placement 892.00 1 
Joint Venture 2924.98 12 
Joint Venture/ Public Offering 156.38 2 
Law 203 15.36 2 
Law 203 Asset 83.98 1 
Law 203 company 144.93 2 
Law 203 minority stake 32.00 4 
Local Investor 23.95 2 
Majority sold on stock market 77.63 3 
Minority sold on stock market 65.87 2 
Private Sale 107.60 4 
Public Offer 2378.39 59 
Public Offer & Private Placement 155.88 1 
Public Offer/ GDRs 105.80 1 
Stake in Joint Venture 379.47 13 
Stock Exchange Sale 116.60 1 
Stock Market 10.34 2 
Trade Sale 755.90 5 
Various Methods 100.63 1 
Unknown/ Unspecified 374.69 10 
Total 15642.49 174 
Source: Calculated from the IFC Privatisation Database (1990 – 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table A2: EGYPT - Privatisation transactions by technique between 1993 and 2000/2001 
Privatisation Technique No. of 
Companies/ 
production 
units 
privatised 
Sale Value in 
L.E. million 
Sale of majority or all shares through the stock market 
Sale of majority interest to an anchor investor 
Sale to Employee Shareholder Associations 
Sale of minority interests in companies 
Sale of production assets 
38 
26 
30 
16 
18 
5,651 
6,702 
870 
1,755 
839 
Sub-total 128 15,817 
Complete Sale of assets 
Lease of production units 
32 
20 
 
Total 180  
Source: PCSU (2001), p. 9. 
 
Table A3: CHINA - Privatisation transactions by technique between 1991 and 2008 
 
Privatisation Method Proceeds (US$ millions No. of transactions/ companies 
"A" Shares Offerings 11.00 1 
"B" Shares Offerings 2459.85 50 
"B" Shares and ADRs 45.00 1 
"B" Shares and GDRs 239.00 1 
"H" share offering 6970.70 54 
"H" Shares (secondary Offering) 134.16 1 
"H" Shares (secondary placement) 30.78 1 
ADRs and H shares 831.29 2 
ADR on  NYSE 625.00 1 
ADRs  4075.09 2 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) 81912.07 35 
Public Offer 52500.57 33 
NYSE Offering 80.00 1 
"S" Shares 67.00 1 
Concession  3297.06 67 
Direct Sale 9442.90 8 
Divestiture (Full and Partial) 17502.78 43 
Greenfield 92.66 4 
Joint Venture 30.00 1 
Lease 237.60 3 
Management and Lease Contract 9.53 2 
Private Sale 1826.90 4 
Unknown/ Unspecified 2152.30 9 
Total 184573.24 325 
Source: Calculated from the IFC Privatisation Database (1990 – 2008)  
   
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Ayubi (1995), p. 10. 
2 Most developing countries suffer from chronic macroeconomic problems such as high external debts, 
deficits in their balance of payments, deficits in their public budgets, and shortage of domestic capital. 
Between 1960 and 1970, external debt of developing countries, for example, increased from $19 billion to 
more than $60 billion, and to $151.3 billion by the end of 1974 (Zaki, 1978). 
3 Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC). www.idsc.gov.eg/Indicators [Accessed on 14/07/2006] 
4 Tesche and Tohamy (1994). 
5See Lin et al. (1998) for a detailed discussion on major problems faced by SOEs. 
6 See Sun and Tong (2003) for further details on the history of China’s SOEs reform. 
7 Graca et. al (1994), p. 3. And a similar argument is presented in Grossman and Helpman (1994), p. 26.  
8 Sader (1993 and 1995) found that privatisation in developing countries attract more FDI inflows to these 
countries. 
9 De Mello (1997), pp. 10 -14. 
10 Given a production function of 
  1HAky d  where the function is in per capita terms, kd is domestic 
capital, and β is the share of domestic physical capital. H is overall stock of knowledge in the host country 
and is represented by: 
 ][ wd kkH  where kw is foreign-owned capital, and α and η are marginal and 
intertemporal elasticities of substitution between foreign and domestic capital; respectively.  The 
intertemporal Optimisation Framework combines the supply and demand sides of the economy, by 
maximising private consumption as follows: 
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where ρ is the rate of time preference of the utility maximiser, and c is private consumption. (See De Mello, 
1997, pp. 12-13 for more details). 
11 See the appendix for the definitions of variables and the expected sign of their coefficients. 
12 Maddala (2001), p. 255, and Harris and Sollis (2003), p. 27. 
13 In order to obtain meaningful causal relationships, time-series models assume that the variables included 
are stationary (i.e. their means, variance and covariance are constant and are independent of time). [Harris 
and Sollis, 2003, pp. 26-27] 
14 Having both the constant and time trend (i.e. deterministic trends) in the unit root test “increases … the 
critical values, making it harder to reject the null hypothesis, even when it should be rejected”. (Harris and 
Sollis, 2003, p. 46) 
15 Harris and Sollis (2003), p. 47. 
16 For more details, see Harris and Sollis (2003), pp. 41 – 57. 
17 In determining the maximum number of lags, we followed Schwert’s (1989) formula, where 𝑙 =
𝑖𝑛𝑡{12(
𝑇
100
)0.25}, where T= sample size, and l = number of lags. In our models T = 45. 
18 Only in the Egyptian model, we will be using HK rather than log of HK. The ADF tests showed that LHK 
is stationary in levels and first difference, while HK (i.e. without taking logs) was found to be non-stationary 
in levels, but stationary in first difference. When we have a combination of I(0) and I(1) variables in levels, 
the appropriate method of estimation should be ARDL (Giles, 2013). However, in the Chinese model all 
variables are I(1) in levels, which indicates that the appropriate estimation method should be Error Correction 
Models. It was, therefore, decided that we use HK in the Egyptian model to unify the method of estimation 
with that of the Chinese model. 
19 In the case of the DLPop variable, the plot of the variable indicates that it does not follow a trend. Hence, 
we choose to accept the results of τγ (i.e. the ADF test with Intercept only). 
20 E-views offers different possible specifications for the potential break. The above results are for when the 
break specification is “intercept only”. When the specification of the break was changed to “trend only”, the 
                                                 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
results became -3.566530 (1) – break in 2014, with p-value of 0.3691, which indicates that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, and hence LGDP is non-stationary.  
21 The above test statistic is according to the modified SB criterion. The results according to the normal SB 
criterion seem to indicate the rejection of the H0, as it was reported as -5.071342. However, given the results 
according to the modified SB for the τγ test, and that the plot of the data indicates a trend in the series, it is 
fair to conclude that Lpop is I(1) in the levels and that the more relevant results are that of the τδ test.   
22 Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). 
23 See Hendry (2000) for more details on the ‘General-to-Specific’ approach. 
24 The general specification for the Chinese ECM was run with 2 lags, while for Egypt, it was found that 
the general specification is best with 1 lag for each explanatory variables. 
25 Due to space limitations, the Eviews results of the collinearity tests for all the reported models are not 
included here. However, they are available upon request.  
26 A Wald test on whether the coefficients of ∆hkt and ∆hkt-1 could not reject the null 
hypothesis of coefficients = 0 at the 5% significance level, but it rejects it at the 10% 
significance level. 
27 Calculated from WDI (2016) 
28 In China, on the other hand, the average domestic investment ratio, for the same time period, is 38.57% 
which is more than the external debt ratio average of 11.47%. Hence, confirming the conclusion of Lin and 
Sosin (2001) and Pattillo et al. (2002). 
29 For more details see Alfaro (2003). 
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